ecopal
02-13-2008, 03:31 PM
Flashback to July 2001:
“...top-secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States.
.. so compelling to Tenet that he decided he and Black should go to the White House immediately...
...this amounted to a strategic warning, meaning the problem was so serious that it required an overall plan and strategy.
Second, this was a major foreign policy problem that needed to be addressed immediately.
They needed to take action that moment — covert, military, whatever — to thwart bin Laden. . .Tenet and Black felt they were not getting through to Rice. ..
..“Around the time of that July meeting, Rice and Bush were more focused on their pet issue: missile defense. And Bush wasn’t interested in ’swatting flies’ — he was already looking for a reason to attack Iraq."
from the:
The White House Mole
Monday, February 4, 2008; 1:41 PM
www.washingtonpost.com
By Dan Froomkin
excerpts:
“Michael Isikoff writes in Newsweek: “In the summer of 2003, Warren Bass, an investigator for the 9/11 Commission, was digging through highly classified National Security Council documents when he came across a trove of material that startled him.
Buried in the files of former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, the documents seemed to confirm charges that the Bush White House had ignored repeated warnings about the threat posed by Osama bin Laden.
Clarke, it turned out, had bombarded national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice in the summer of 2001 with impassioned e-mails and memos warning of an Al Qaeda attack–and urging a more forceful U.S. government response.
... Bob Woodward disclosed in his book “State of Denial” that commission investigators weren’t told about a July 2001 meeting, in which Rice waved off warnings that should have put the government on high alert for an al-Qaeda attack.”
In an excerpt from his book, Woodward wrote: “On July 10, 2001, two months before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, then-CIA Director George J. Tenet met with his counterterrorism chief, J. Cofer Black, at CIA headquarters to review the latest on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization.
Black laid out the case, consisting of communications intercepts and other top-secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States.
... so compelling to Tenet that he decided he and Black should go to the White House immediately.
“Tenet called Condoleezza Rice, then national security adviser, from the car and said he needed to see her right away. . . .
“He and Black hoped to convey the depth of their anxiety and get Rice to kick-start the government into immediate action. . . .
“Tenet hoped his abrupt request for an immediate meeting would shake Rice. He and Black, a veteran covert operator, had two main points when they met with her. First, al-Qaeda was going to attack American interests, possibly in the United States itself.
Black emphasized that this amounted to a strategic warning, meaning the problem was so serious that it required an overall plan and strategy. Second, this was a major foreign policy problem that needed to be addressed immediately. They needed to take action that moment — covert, military, whatever — to thwart bin Laden. . . .
“Tenet and Black felt they were not getting through to Rice. ..
“Around the time of that July meeting, Rice and Bush were more focused on their pet issue: missile defense. And Bush wasn’t interested in ’swatting flies’ — he was already looking for a reason to attack Iraq.
..And just a few weeks ago, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, who served as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the 9/11 commission, wrote in a New York Times op-ed that “the recent revelations that the C.I.A. destroyed videotaped interrogations of Qaeda operatives leads us to conclude that the agency failed to respond to our lawful requests for information about the 9/11 plot. Those who knew about those videotapes — and did not tell us about them — obstructed our investigation."
“...top-secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States.
.. so compelling to Tenet that he decided he and Black should go to the White House immediately...
...this amounted to a strategic warning, meaning the problem was so serious that it required an overall plan and strategy.
Second, this was a major foreign policy problem that needed to be addressed immediately.
They needed to take action that moment — covert, military, whatever — to thwart bin Laden. . .Tenet and Black felt they were not getting through to Rice. ..
..“Around the time of that July meeting, Rice and Bush were more focused on their pet issue: missile defense. And Bush wasn’t interested in ’swatting flies’ — he was already looking for a reason to attack Iraq."
from the:
The White House Mole
Monday, February 4, 2008; 1:41 PM
www.washingtonpost.com
By Dan Froomkin
excerpts:
“Michael Isikoff writes in Newsweek: “In the summer of 2003, Warren Bass, an investigator for the 9/11 Commission, was digging through highly classified National Security Council documents when he came across a trove of material that startled him.
Buried in the files of former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, the documents seemed to confirm charges that the Bush White House had ignored repeated warnings about the threat posed by Osama bin Laden.
Clarke, it turned out, had bombarded national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice in the summer of 2001 with impassioned e-mails and memos warning of an Al Qaeda attack–and urging a more forceful U.S. government response.
... Bob Woodward disclosed in his book “State of Denial” that commission investigators weren’t told about a July 2001 meeting, in which Rice waved off warnings that should have put the government on high alert for an al-Qaeda attack.”
In an excerpt from his book, Woodward wrote: “On July 10, 2001, two months before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, then-CIA Director George J. Tenet met with his counterterrorism chief, J. Cofer Black, at CIA headquarters to review the latest on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist organization.
Black laid out the case, consisting of communications intercepts and other top-secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States.
... so compelling to Tenet that he decided he and Black should go to the White House immediately.
“Tenet called Condoleezza Rice, then national security adviser, from the car and said he needed to see her right away. . . .
“He and Black hoped to convey the depth of their anxiety and get Rice to kick-start the government into immediate action. . . .
“Tenet hoped his abrupt request for an immediate meeting would shake Rice. He and Black, a veteran covert operator, had two main points when they met with her. First, al-Qaeda was going to attack American interests, possibly in the United States itself.
Black emphasized that this amounted to a strategic warning, meaning the problem was so serious that it required an overall plan and strategy. Second, this was a major foreign policy problem that needed to be addressed immediately. They needed to take action that moment — covert, military, whatever — to thwart bin Laden. . . .
“Tenet and Black felt they were not getting through to Rice. ..
“Around the time of that July meeting, Rice and Bush were more focused on their pet issue: missile defense. And Bush wasn’t interested in ’swatting flies’ — he was already looking for a reason to attack Iraq.
..And just a few weeks ago, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, who served as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the 9/11 commission, wrote in a New York Times op-ed that “the recent revelations that the C.I.A. destroyed videotaped interrogations of Qaeda operatives leads us to conclude that the agency failed to respond to our lawful requests for information about the 9/11 plot. Those who knew about those videotapes — and did not tell us about them — obstructed our investigation."